The Briefing, Vol. XII, Issue 51
This week:
- Democrats may find themselves less competitive for president after 2030
- The playing field tilts for both House and Senate
- Cameron may already be preparing a 2026 Senate run
Census 2030: Democrats just had a bad election. But they may be facing down some much more serious problems than that.
It’s that time of year again when the U.S. Census updates its population projections and various groups issue projections of what that means for the Congressional and presidential maps. Looking back to last year’s maps, it is clear why Democrats have a lot more to worry about than the 2024 election or the coming second Trump presidential term.
The December 2023 projection by the right-leaning non-profit American Redistricting Project looked like this:
The organization will be issuing a new projection soon. But note that this map represents a net 12-seat swing from Harris states to Trump states.
A simultaneous projection from the leftist Brennan Center looks even worse for Democrats, transferring an additional Congressional District (and thus one more vote in the Electoral College) from the swing state of Michigan to the solidly Red state of South Carolina, which Trump carried by 18 points. (Note that the numbers on this map refer to each state’s total number of House seats, not electoral votes.)
To be sure, these are only projections. Newer ones coming this month may be different, and even those may overstate or understate population swings between the states by the end of the decade. A lot will also change in politics over the next eight years, and in ways no one can predict.
Having said all that, what do these projections mean for the nation’s near-term political future, all other things being equal?
To put it very simply, a shift of 10 or 11 electoral votes to solidly Red states from solid Blue or swing states (four to Texas, three to Florida, and one each to Idaho, Utah, Tennessee, and maybe South Carolina), and of a net 12 electoral votes from Harris 2024 states to Trump 2024 states, will be devastating for whatever Democrat runs for president in 2032. And unlike in 2020, when West Virginia lost a seat and Oregon gained, these projections do not hint at any corresponding shift in the other direction.
In 2024, Vice President Kamala Harris failed to make any “Red” state remotely competitive. Assuming that the typical non-swing “Red” states are all safe, a new map that looks like these would give the 2032 Republican presidential nominee about 230 almost-guaranteed electoral votes, and the Democrat only about 215. That advantage of roughly 15 translates to a 22-vote swing from the seven-EV Democratic advantage that Kamala Harris started with in 2024. That is the equivalent of handing the Republican nominee an automatic win in Maryland or Massachusetts before the election starts.
The Battlegrounds: Assume, then, that the swing states of 2032 are the same ones from 2024 — perhaps a perilous assumption, but probably the best we can make. The seven swing states of 2024, all of which Trump just carried, would be worth approximately 94 electoral votes. The Republican nominee in 2032 would only need 39 of them to get to a 269-269 tie for a likely win in the U.S. House. The Democrat would need 55 to get to 270 and a win.
So for instance, if this projected 2032 map had been the map in 2024, then a “Blue Wall” strategy like the one Harris attempted would not have worked. Trump could have won this year’s election with a “Sun Belt only” strategy that ignored Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania — and even Nevada, for that matter.
Another 2032 map scenario under this projection: Start with the 2024 state results, then give Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Georgia to Harris instead of Trump. In that scenario, Trump still wins.
Not all of the particulars are clear, but the bottom line is: Starting in eight years, the path to victory will likely become harder for any Democratic presidential candidate. That is not to say it’s impossible — in 2008, Barack Obama carried Indiana — but Democratic victory will require a better candidate and a more advantageous environment than it has for a long time. Democrats’ only hope is to reverse population losses in California, New York, Illinois, and other liberal bastions relative to the overall U.S. population.
Along with our discussion last week about the Senate map, this is yet another reason Trump’s re-election, though not “overwhelming” or a “landslide,” is so pivotal. It is depriving Democrats of a chance to pull the levers in their favor one more time before they encounter a new structural disadvantage based on the very thing Republicans used to fear most — demography.
House 2032: If this projection becomes reality, the House map will be another important consideration for the future. Democrats in California (potentially losing four seats) and Illinois (potentially losing two) have already maximally gerrymandered their House delegations, so they will probably not be able to avoid cutting out some of their own members in their new maps. (California adopted a supposedly non-partisan system years ago, but Democrats have successfully gamed it ever since.) New York is another story, since Democrats there tried unsuccessfully to abolish a redistricting regimen by their own non-partisan panel.
Also, when Republicans gain additional seats in solid Red states that are getting redder (including Idaho, Utah, and Tennessee), the chances are good that they will be able to draw maps as good or even better for themselves. In Idaho, for example, there is no way to produce a third seat that has a Democratic voter majority, and in fact, it is a relatively simple matter to create three districts that are all more than 55 percent registered Republicans, if one is motivated to do so.
Demographic change is probably also Republicans’ friend. For example, given current trends in South Texas, Republicans will easily be able to draw solidly Republican districts that are majority-Hispanic, satisfying all Voting Rights Act criteria for minority-majority districts while also maximizing Republican power.
History tells us there is no such thing as a permanent majority. But there have been durable majorities that have lasted for decades at a time. For example, Democrats held a 42-year majority in the U.S. House between 1953 and 1995.
Is it possible that Republicans will enjoy a similar long-term structural advantage? Don’t get your hopes up too high — but maybe. Much depends on how well President-elect Donald Trump does in the next four years, and on how lucky he is.
Trump is likely to lose his friendly House majority in 2026 either way, just because of the midterm effect that almost all presidents suffer. But he also has a decent chance of having Republicans hang on in the Senate. And the Census will probably provide a favorable environment for the GOP to regain the House by 2032, regardless of who is president by then.
In short, given the clues we have previously looked at regarding future Senate control, the data for future House control, and future Electoral College trends, things look like they will get better for Republicans and worse for Democrats in the medium term.
At the same time, a less and less ideological Republican Party under Trump could result in some serious setbacks to the traditional fusionist-conservative movement of the Reagan era.
Senate 2026
Kentucky: Sen. Mitch McConnell (R) hasn’t announced for sure, but he is highly likely to retire from the U.S. Senate at the end of his current term. Already, former Attorney General Daniel Cameron is believed to be sending out text messages testing interest in his candidacy for the seat.
The only Democrat with a shot at the seat would be Gov. Andy Beshear (D), to whom Cameron lost by five percentage points in 2023. Beshear has unequivocally stated that he is not interested in running for any open Senate seat, but the national Democratic Party may badger him to do so, given the paucity of easy pickup chances on the map next cycle. Beshear is popular, but Kentucky voters will probably be a lot more hostile toward the idea of electing a Democratic senator than a Democratic governor.
